When software gets authority to act9 pillars
Nine pillars hold when software acts.
Model governance asks whether an output is accurate. An agent acts, so the controls have to hold around the run: the identity it borrows, the data it reads, the tools it touches, the changes it quietly accumulates. We pressure-tested this set against the frameworks your risk team already reads: NIST's AI RMF, the OWASP agentic top ten, ISO 42001, and the EU AI Act. We also tested it against the questions a head of model risk actually asks. Nine pillars survived.
01Do we know every agent, and what each may do?
Mandate, inventory & tiering
- A registry that finds agents, including the ones business units stand up themselves
- A risk tier per agent, set by materiality and autonomy, so scrutiny is proportional, not uniform
- Permitted tools and data enforced in the platform and reconciled daily against what was declared
- Actions that always need a person, named before the agent ever runs
e.g. A business unit spins up a copilot on a SaaS platform. The registry sweep finds it in days, and it gets a tier before it gets traffic.
02Who is acting, and on whose behalf?
Identity & delegation
- A first-class identity per agent, never a shared service account
- Short-lived, scoped credentials: nothing standing, nothing stored in a config file
- A delegated agent can only end up with less authority than the person it works for, never more
- Credentials die when the agent does
e.g. An agent working a steward's queue borrows that steward's scope for exactly one run. Nothing is shared, and nothing outlives the job.
03Is it acting on data it should trust?
Grounded knowledge
- An approved corpus with owners and freshness rules, so the agent's reading list is governed
- Retrieval that respects the caller's permissions, not the agent's
- Provenance on everything it reads and remembers, with memory screened for poisoning
- No confident answer from an unowned source
e.g. An agent quotes a policy PDF that was superseded in March. The corpus check catches the stale source before the answer ships.
04Would you defend how it behaves?
Accountable conduct
- Declared limits: calls an agent must not make, however well it performs
- Fairness tested across the whole trajectory of actions, not just the final output
- Explanations a business reviewer can follow, proportionate to consequence
- Agent involvement disclosed, with a person reachable behind it
e.g. A triage agent quietly deprioritizes one region's exceptions. Every single call looks defensible. Only the trajectory test sees the pattern.
05Does it do the job right, and does it still?
Proven competence
- Every tool and step tested alone, then the whole path end to end
- A second-line holdout set, refreshed from production and never used for tuning
- The path judged too: right sources, no fabricated figures
- Model-as-judge only after the judge is validated against humans
e.g. Two extraction errors cancel out and the total comes out right. The outcome test passes. The step test still fails the run.
06If it's hijacked, how bad is the worst day?
Assume-breach security
- A written blast-radius answer per agent: worst case with the credentials and tools it holds
- Injection treated as containment, not filtering, including what arrives inside documents
- Tools and models pinned and vetted; an updated dependency waits for review
- Code execution sandboxed, secrets vaulted, fallback and safe shutdown rehearsed
e.g. The worst-day question is answered in writing: fully hijacked, the most this agent can move is a draft into a review queue.
07Can you stop it, and is oversight still real?
Live control
- Consequential steps hold for a person who accepts, edits, or rejects
- The checkpoint itself is watched: approval speed and rates that look like rubber-stamping get flagged
- Stopping at three scopes: one run, one agent class, one whole domain
- Loop, retry, and spend budgets, with circuit-breakers so one agent's failure doesn't cascade
e.g. Approvals start clearing in four seconds flat. That's a latency tax, not oversight, and it's flagged before your auditor finds it.
08Can you replay any run, and trust the replay?
The sealed run record
- Traces written by the platform, never by the agent, append-only and tamper-evident
- Every step, tool call, human decision, output, and cost, per run
- Multi-agent chains stitched into one causal record
- Production runs sampled and re-scored, with drift thresholds per agent
e.g. The examiner asks why Tuesday's entry changed. You replay the run from a record the agent couldn't touch: prompt, tools, and sign-off.
09Is what's running the thing you approved?
Change & lifecycle integrity
- An agent is a composite of model, prompt, tools, corpus, and guardrails, and every part is version-pinned
- A substantial change to any part goes back through approval, with autonomy reset until evidence
- Bought agents held to the same bar as built ones, with telemetry and exit in the contract
- Retirement is a decision: credentials revoked, record archived
e.g. The vendor swaps the base model overnight. The pinned version keeps running. The new one goes back through approval.
The run record
Authority is stamped into the record. Evaluation is scored against it. Runtime controls write to it. Assurance reads from it.
On OntaVera, the run record lives on the same sealed ledger as the rest of your governance, so you answer an auditor by querying the record, not by reconstructing what happened.